War in Ukraine is no longer fought solely with weapons. It is also fought with checks. After more than four years of conflict, Russia faces a problem it cannot hide: it needs men.
The figures make it clear, because the rise in economic incentives directly reflects the difficulty in finding volunteers, something that has become a political urgency.
According to recent investigations, the Kremlin has intensified pressure on the regions to meet recruitment quotas.
That has led each territory to compete by raising bonuses to unprecedented figures, generating a kind of “auction” for soldiers that even international analysts find surprising.
The human cost behind the incentives
The reason for this increase is simple: casualties. Western sources and analysis centers estimate that Russia has suffered hundreds of thousands of deaths, injuries or disappearances since 2022.
That reality translates into a constant need for replacements, because the war of attrition requires a continuous flow of new fighters, something hard to sustain without extraordinary measures.
To avoid a massive mobilization — unpopular within the country — Moscow has opted for a more discreet but equally effective strategy: paying.
And here is where the key change comes in, since the incentives have moved from a few thousand euros to figures that multiply the Russian average salary, making enlistment an economic decision for many.
Up to 50,000 euros: how the system works
The amounts are not uniform. They depend on the region, the moment and the political pressure each governor faces.
In some documented cases, the initial payments reach 40,000 euros, to which additional bonuses from the Ministry of Defense are added, bringing the total to around 50,000 euros.
The system operates as a sum of incentives: initial payment, monthly salary, compensations and family benefits.
This means that enlisting can mean income well above the national average in just a few days, which explains why many citizens see it as an opportunity despite the evident risk.
“More than 400,000 fighters have to be sent to the front annually,” a demand that explains the pressure on the Russian regions.
A war that is also fought economically
The use of money as a recruitment tool is not new, but it had never reached this level.
What we are seeing now is different, because the economic incentive has become the main engine of recruitment, even displacing the traditional patriotic discourse.
In parallel, other practices have emerged that reflect the lack of volunteers: recruitment in prisons, pressure on students or aggressive campaigns in resource-poor areas.
All point to the same thing, since the system needs to keep feeding itself with new soldiers to sustain the front, and money is the fastest route.
The risk of turning war into a market
This model raises an uncomfortable question: when the incentive is economic, war changes its nature.
It is not only about defending a country, but about accepting a contract where the risk of death is offset by a specific amount, something that changes the perception of the conflict.
Moreover, it generates internal inequalities. The poorer regions are the ones that contribute the most recruits, because the incentives prove more attractive.
That causes the war to fall on those who have fewer economic alternatives, a pattern that has already been seen in other conflicts and repeats itself here.
What this change in Russia’s strategy reveals
The increase in payments is not just a one-off measure. It is a symptom.
It indicates that Russia is trying to avoid more unpopular decisions, such as general mobilization, while keeping the war effort from unduly disrupting daily life for the majority.
But it also hints at a limit. Because if the price continues to rise, it means the problem does not disappear.
And there lies the key: when a war needs to pay more and more for its soldiers, something in its structure begins to fail, even if it is not spoken aloud.
